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overcrowded dockets. An additional advantage is minimization of the
combatant attitude engendered by an adversary proceeding. The arbitra-
tor's decision can do much to relieve the strained feelings and discontent
which will be the result of litigation, no matter which side is victorious.
The strike provokes bitterness and rancor between employer and em-
ployee, both of whom feel themselves wronged. A time consuming, tech-
nical and costly court battle can only further this animosity.
INITIAL IMPRISONMENT FOR THE VIOLATION OF CITY
ORDINANCES
Statutes in thirty-five states authorize municipal corporations to
enforce their ordinances by the imposition of initial imprisonment upon
convicted offenders as a part of the basic punishment, as well as to
enforce the payment of a fine.1 Although it is well settled that im-
1. Alabama: May enforce by fine not exceeding $100 and by imprisonment or hard
labor not exceeding six months, one or both. ALA. CODE tit. 37, § 455 (1940). Arizona:
$300 and 3 months limits. A~iz. CODE ANN. c. 16, §1105 (1939). California: $500 and
6 months limits. CAL. Gov. CODE ANN. §36900 (1951). Florida: $500 and 60 days limits.
FLA. STAT. § 165.19 (1955). Georgia: Georgia's cities and towns are governed by
charters which are altered by special acts. Limitations on cities, etc., must be gleaned
from these various charters. In Calhoun v. Little, 106 Ga. 336, 32 S.E. 86 (1898), the
court declared that under the charter of the town of Waresboro there was no authority
to impose initial imprisonment. However, in Jones v. Langford, 141 Ga. 336, 81 S.E.
885 (1914), Atlanta charter provisions were construed to allow for initial imprisonment,
without any provision for discharge upon payment of a fine. Idaho: $100 and 30 days
limits. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 50-1109 (1949). Indiana: $300 and 6 months limits. IND.
ANN. STAT. § 48-1407 (Burns 1950). Iowa: $100 and 30 days limits. IowA CODE ANN.
§ 366.1 (1949). Kansas: No statutory limits on 1st class cities. KAN. GEN. STAT. § 13-
424 (1949). $100 and 3 months limits in 2d and 3d class cities. Id. at §§ 14-424, 15-440.
Kentucky: $100 and 50 days limits. Ky. REV. STAT. §§ 83.010, 85.120, 86.110, 87.060, 88.107
(1955). Louisiana: $100 and 30 days limits. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 33:401(32) (1950).
But the penalties for driving under the influence of alcohol may be $500 and 60 days.
Id. at (Stipp. 1956). Maryland: $100 and 90 days limits. MD. ANN. CODE GEN. LAWS
art. 23A, § 3 (1951). Michigan: $500 and 6 months limits. MicH. CoilP. LAWS § 89.2
(1948). But in home rule cities the limits are $500 and 90 days. Id. at § 117.4i(19).
Minnesota: $100 and 3 months limits. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 412.231 (West Supp. 1954).
Mississippi: $100 and 30 days limits. Miss. CODE ANN. § 3374-137 (Supp. 1954). Missouri:
Punishment may be by fine, imprisonment, or both. No limits are stated in the statute.
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 74.657 (Vernon 1952). Montana: $300 and 90 days limits. MONT.
REV. CODES ANN. § 11-950 (1947). Nebraska: Cities of the 1st and 2d classes and
villages may only fine to enforce ordinances. NED. REV. STAT. §§ 16-225, 17-505 (1943).
Cities of the metropolitan class may impose both fines and imprisonment with no statutory
limits. Id. at § 14-102(25). Cities of the primary class have limits of $100 and 6 months.
Id. at § 15-263 (Supp. 1955). The latter statute, which went into effect on September
18, 1955, for the first time allowed cities of the primary class to impose initial imprison-
ment. Nevada: $300 and 6 months limits. NEV. Comp. LAWS § 1128 (1929). New Jersey:
$200 and 90 days limits. N. J. STAT. ANN. § 40:49-5 (1940). New Mexico: $300 and 90
days limits. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 14:21-47 (1953). New York: No limitations stated by
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prisonment may be imposed to enforce the payment of a fine,2 imprison-
statute; may fine or imprison or both. N.Y. TOWN LAW § 135. North Carolina: $50 and
30 days limits. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-4 (1951). North Dakota: $100 and 3 months
limits for cities. N.D. REv. CODE § 40-0506 (1943). For villages the limits are $50 and
5 days. Id. at § 0507 (Supp. 1953). Ohio: $500 and 6 months limits. OHIO REv. CoDE
ANN. § 715.67 (1953). Oklahoma: $100 and 3 months limits. OKLA. STAT. tit. 11, § 672
(1951). Oregon: $50 and 20 days limits: ORE. REv. STAT. § 221.916 (1955). Rhode
Island: $20 and 10 days limits, unless other penalties are specifically prescribed by
statute. R.I. GEN. LAWS c. 333, § 23 (1938). South Carolina: $100 or 30 days imprison-
ment in the alternative; the municipality may impose one or the other, but not both.
S.C. CODE § 47-61 (1952). South Dakota: $500 and 90 days limits. S.D. CODE § 45.9901
(1939). Tennessee: Cities incorporated under general city law may impose only fines.
TENN. CODE ANN. § 6-202 (1955). However, under city manager plan, cities may impose
fines and imprisonment, with $50 and 30 days limits. Id. at 6-2120. Utah: $300 and 3
months limits. UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-8-84 (1953). Virginia: Fines or other punishment
for violations, with no statutory limits set. VA. CODE § 15-5 (1950). Washington: $100
and 30 days limits. WASH. REv. CODE § 35.23.440(31) (1951). West Virginia: Reasonable
fines and 30 days limits. W.VA. CODE ANN. § 507 (1955).
In those states where there is no authorization to enforce ordinances by initial
imprisonment, there is usually a statutory limit upon the amount of fine which may
be imposed. Arkansas: $25 or double for repitition. ARK. STAT. § 19-2409 (1947).
Colorado: $300. CoLo. REv. STAT. c. 139, § 32-1 (1953). Connecticut: $100, unless
specifically provided more by statute. CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 619 (1949). Delaware: $5
limit for unincorporated towns. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 22, § 102 (1953). $10 for town
ordinances. Id. at tit. 11, § 5904. Illinois: $200. ILL. REv. STAT. c. 24, § 23-106 (1955).
Maine: Suitable penalties, ranging from $5 to $500 for specific offenses. ME. REV. STAT.
c. 91, § 86 (1954). Massachusetts: Not to exceed $20, unless specifically authorized more
by statute. MASS. ANN. LAWS c. 40, § 21 (1944). New Hampshire: $20. N.H. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 47:17 (1955). Pennsytvania: $100. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 15198, 3451,
9686, 12198-1006 (1939). Texas: $200. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. § 1011 (Supp. 1950).
Vermont: $20. VT. REv. STAT. § 3738 (1947). Wisconsin: No limitation stated. Wisc.
STAT. § 66.115 (1953). Wyoming: $100. Wyo. ComP. STAT. ANN. § 29-338 (1945).
2. ALA. CODE tit. 37, § 586 (1940) ; ARK. STAT. § 19-2413 (1947) ; COLO. REV. STAT.
c. 139, § 86-2 (1953) ; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 5719 (1953) ; GA. CODE ANN. § 69-704
(Supp. 1955) ; IDAHO CODE ANN. § 50-1109 (1949) ; ILL. REV. STAT. c. 24, § 23-106 (1955) ;
IND. ANN. STAT. § 4-2414 (Burns 1946); IoWA CODE ANN. § 367.10 (1949); KAN. GEN.
STAT. § 13-424 (1949) ; Ky. REv. STAT. § 26.450 (1955) ; LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15-529.3
(1950); ME. REv. STAT. c. 149, § 40 (1954); MD. ANN. CODE GEN. LAWS art. 38, § 4
(1951) ; MASS. ANN. LAWS c. 280, § 14 (1944) ; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 412.19(26) (West
1946) ; See Miss. CODE ANN. § 3374 (Supp. 1954) ; Mo. STAT. ANN. § 74.657 (Vernon
1952); MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 94-100-28 (1947); NEB. REv. STAT. § 14-102(25)
(1943) ; NEV. Comp. LAWS § 1167 (1929) ; N. J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:8-30 (1952) ; N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 38:1-3 (1953); N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW § 20(22); N.D. REv. CODE § 40-1112
(1943) ; OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2947.10-47.11 (1953) ; OKLA. STAT. tit. 11, § 672 (1951) ;
ORE. REV. STAT. § 221.918 (1955); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 15197 (1939); S.C. CODE
§ 15-908 (1952); TENN. CODE ANN. § 6-2120 (1955), in city manager plan cities;
UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-8-85 (1953); VA. CODE § 15-5 (1950(; WASH. REv. CODE
§ 10.04.110 (1951); Wisc. STAT. § 66.115 (1953); Wyo. Comp. STAT. ANN. § 291338
(1945). See Note, 1 VAND. L. REv. 262, 269 (1948).
Although it is not within the scope of this note to deal with the problems raised
by the various courts' and legislatures' acceptance of the doctrine that imprisonment may
be authorized to enforce the collection of a fine imposed in a summary or civil action,
certain observations should be made in passing. If the action is civil to recover a penalty
or forfeiture under a municipal ordinance, then the imprisonment for failure to pay
the debt to the city logically should be considered imprisonment for debt. However,
precedent and established authority is contra to this position. Lord Ellesmere felt that
the decision by Coke in Clarks Case, 5 Co. Rep. 64a, 77 Eng. Rep. 152 (1596), should
have been confined to limiting the power of the community to assess fines, but with
the power to recover through imprisonment, since the "Statute of Magna Carta never
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ment as an initial part of the penalty for the violation of a municipal
ordinance posits grave legal questions. The sanction of imprisonment
is clearly criminal in nature ;3 yet the procedural safeguards afforded are,
in prosecutions for violations of the ordinances, often inadequate and
loosely applied. Such summary proceedings are an encroachment upon
that right normally most closely guarded by both laymen and the legal
profession, personal freedom.
It is clear that imprisonment is a sanction which should be initially
imposed only upon conviction for a criminal offense;' the Wisconsin
meant to protect such obstinate persons as should refuse to set forward" the payment
of the fine ordered by the court. ELLESMERE, OBSERVATIONS ON THE REPORTS, 13. See
note 8 infra. The courts in this country, when faced with the argument, have stated that
imprisonment to enforce the payment of the fine is not imprisonment for debt. See,
e.g., Kennedy v. People, 122 Ill. 649, 13 N.E. 213 (1887). Wisconsin (see note 5 infra)
holds that in the civil action imprisonment may be used to enforce the payment of a fine.
Indiana also allows a civil action to recover a penalty, and allows imprisonment to
enforce it. See note 27 infra and accompanying text. Despite the seemingly unanimous
rejection of the argument of imprisonment for debt, it is difficult to find any logical
basis for the rejection. A practical legal problem is raised by the imprisonment for
failure to pay arising out of a civil procedure. A solvent defendant's penalty is obviously
less severe than the penalty which must be paid by the insolvent defendant, the loss of
his personal liberty. It appears that the proper procedure in such cases should be to
enforce the payment through an action of the court whereby the convicted defendant
is called in to show cause, insolvency, for not paying the debt which accrued to the city
from the civil action. If the defendant cannot show insolvency he may then be imprisoned
for contempt of the court order to pay.
3. Courts in the various states have observed: "... [O]ur conclusion is that
offenses for the violation of municipal ordinances, to which a penalty, such as fine or
imprisonment, is attached as a punishment, are 'criminal offenses'....." State ex rel.
Erickson v. West, 42 Minn. 147, 43 N.W. 845 (1889). "Where the violation of an
ordinance is punishable by fine only, the proceeding before a justice of the peace is a
civil suit. . . . The justice having power to impose punishment by imprisonment alone,
the case is not within the authorities cited above which apply to a civil suit. This is in
the nature of a criminal proceeding before a justice of the peace, and not a civil suit in the
justices court." Unger v. Inhabitants of Fanwood Tp., 69 N.J. L. 548, 55 A. 42 (1903).
"The assumption that the proceedings are civil, and not criminal, is based on the form of
the judgment, it being an ordinary judgment for money in the amount of a fine, which
the court assessed. No imprisonment is imposed, nor is any provided as a means of
collecting the judgment." Tucumcari v. Belmore, 18 N.M. 331, 137 Pac. 585 (1913). In
Ex parte Bochman, 20 Okla. Crim. 78, 201 Pac. 537 (1921), it was held that any action
where punishment may be initial imprisonment is criminal. "[W]here the court is
empowered to inflict upon the accused . . . imprisonment aside from any pecuniary
penalty or forfeiture, such proceeding becomes so far criminal in its nature . . . that
a person acquitted thereof cannot be again put in jeopardy for the same offense." City
of Portland v. Erickson, 39 Ore. 1, 62 Pac. 753 (1900). ". . . [T]here would seem
to be some reason for holding an act criminal which is either by the general or local law
directly punishable by imprisonment. City of Huron v. Carter, 5 S.D. 4, 57 N.W. 947
(1894).
4. The American Law Institute has been working for some three years to prepare
a model code of penal and correctional law. In an April, 1956, article, Professor Herbert
Wechsler remarked concerning the proposed code: "The solution that we offer involves
the creation of a grade of offenses which does not constitute a 'crime' for purposes of any
disability and which upon conviction carries no severer sentence than a fine or civil
penalty or forfeiture. We have, in short equated 'crime' and possibility of sentence of
probation or imprisonment. Only when the culpable violation of such penal statutes is
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Supreme Court has held, moreover, that such a sanction may constitu-
tionally be imposed only upon conviction for a crime.' Although the
constitutional argument has been summarily dismissed by other courts
which have considered the problem,6 there is a growing acceptance of the
thesis that initial imprisonment should not be imposed unless criminal
procedural safeguards are afforded." Under the English common law,
the courts established the precedent that a municipality may not impose
initial imprisonment for the violation of a by-law, although imprison-
ment could be imposed to enforce the payment of a fine.' Various
authorities have observed that the English Parliament by statute author-
ized summary conviction, with initial imprisonment as a sanction, with-
out criminal procedural safeguards, for the commission of "petty of-
fenses."'  A few state courts have referred to this practice of Parlia-
ment in support of the imprisoning initially through a summary process
by municipalities in this country."0 This analogy is obviously specious.
established may a sentence of probation or imprisonment be passed. We would impose
this settlement on the entire corpus of the regulatory law, whether or not the statutes are
included in the penal code." (emphasis added) Wechsler, The American Law Institute:
Some Observations on its Model Penal Code, 42 A.B.A.J. 321 (1956). "Consequently, the
question whether a violation of a particular police regulation is a public tort or a real
crime depends on whether the legislative body intends the penalty provided to be
compensation or punishment. Whenever imprisonment is prescribed or permitted it is
clear that the latter is the case." Note, 35 HAxv. L. REv. 462, 463 (1922). See Note, 15
HARV. L. REV. 660, 661 (1902) and the opinions of the various state courts cited note 3
supra.
5. State ex rel. Keefe v. Schmiege, 251 Wis. 79, 28 N.W.2d 345, 174 A.L.R. 1338
(1947). The court held that only a sovereign may create a crime, and, therefore, since
a city is not a sovereign, it may not create and punish for a crime. Imprisonment may
not be imposed initially, because such imprisonment would violate the constitutional
provision that involuntary servitude may be exacted only as a punishment for a crime.
The unprecedented holding of the Schmiege case inspired a flood of comment. See
Notes, 2 OKLA. L. REv. 98 (1949) ; 34 VA. L. REv. 214 (1948) ; 96 U. PA. L. REV. 582
(1948) ; 27 NEV. L. REv. 473 (1948) ; 16 U. KAN. CITY L. RMV. 42 (1948) ; 1948 Wis. L.
REv. 96 (1948) ; 36 GEo. L. 1. 432 (1948). For what seems the most able discussion of
the problem see Note, 1 VAND. L. REv. 262 (1948).
6. See Bray v. State, 140 Ala. 172, 37 So. 250 (1904), Pearson v. Wimbish, 124 Ga.
701, 52 S.E. 751 (1906), City of Chicago v. Coleman, 254 11. 338, 98 N.E. 521 (1912).
7. See note 13 infra.
8. In Clark's Case, 5 Co. Rep. 64a, 77 Eng. Rep. 152 (1956), Lord Coke held that
the violation of a municipal ordinance could not be punished by imprisonment. His
reasoning was followed in Hutchins v. Player, Bridg. 0. 272, 124 Eng. Rep. 585 (1663),
where it was stated that "if a by-law or ordinance be made that upon doing or omitting
such an act, the party should be imprisoned, it is naught. . . . [I]t cannot be done by
a by-law." Id. at 587. The question also seemed settled in Waggoner v. Fish, 2 Brownl.
284, 123 Eng. Rep. 944 (1610), where the court stated that" . . . [Tjhey could not
inflict confiscation of goods nor imprisonment, but may inflict precuniary punish-
ment. . . . " Id. at 947.
9. See Frankfurter and Corcoran, Petty Federal Offenses and the Constitutional
Guaranty of Trial by Jury, 39 Hagv. L. REv. 917 (1926), and District of Columbia v.
Clawans, 300 U.S. 617 (1936).
10. See State ex rel. Sellars v. Parker, 87 Fla. 181, 100 So. 260 (1924) ; City of
Fort Scott v. Arbuckle, 165 Kan. 374, 196 P.2d 217 (1948).
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There is a substantial difference between a locality authorizing initial
imprisonment in a summary action and Parliament authorizing the pro-
cedure; this is clear from the variance in the English cases" noted above
and the Parliamentary statutes.
Although many writers assert broadly that the weight of authority
in the various states holds that prosecutions for the violation of munici-
pal ordinances are "civil" actions, 2 a study of the pertinent statutes and
cases shows that this assertion is fallacious; in a clear majority of states
such actions are criminal, and not civil." Courts in various other states
11. See note 8 supra.
12. See 9 MCQUILLEN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 27.06 (3d ed. 1950) ; 2 DILLoN,
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 636 (5th ed. 1911).
13. California: The "violation of a city ordinance is a misdemeanor." CAL. Gov.
CODE ANN. § 36900 (1951). Actions enforcing municipal ordinances are criminal and
not civil actions. People v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 168 Cal. 496, 143 Pac. 727 (1914).
Connecticut: Statute gives municipal courts criminal jurisdiction over violations of
municipal ordinances. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 7579 (1949). Idaho: Criminal procedure is
followed in actions for violation of municipal ordinances. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 50-344
(1949). Iowa: Actions for violation of municipal ordinances are criminal actions. IoWA
CODE ANN. § 602.28 (1949. See City of Burlington v. Unterkircher, 99 Iowa 401, 68
N.W. 795 (1896). Kansas: Criminal procedure for violation. KAN. GEN. STAT. § 13-615
(1949). Kentucky: Violation in 1st class cities is'a misdemeanor. Ky. REv. STAT. § 83.010
(1955) ; criminal jurisdiction over ordinance violations is in the police courts. Id. at
§ 26.010. Louisiana: Although tried summarily it is a criminal case. LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 13:2016 (1950). Maine: Criminal jurisdiction covers violations in municipal
courts. ME. REV. STAT. c.146, § 2 (1954). Maryland: When fine or penalty is imposed
for an act, it "shall be deemed a criminal offense.. . . " MD. ANN. CODE GEN. LAWS art
38, § 1 (1951). Massachusetts: Criminal offense recovered by indictment or complaint
MAss. ANN. LAWS c. 40, § 21 (1944). Prosecutions are in the name of the common-
wealth. See Commonwealth v. Rawson, 183 Mass. 491, 67 N.E. 605 (1903). Michigan:
Criminal cases. MICH. CoMp. LAWS § 90.5 (1948). Mississippi: Criminal offense. Miss.
CODE ANN. § 3374-78 (Supp. 1950). See Sykes v. City of Crystal Springs, 216 Miss. 18,
61 So.2d 387 (1952). Montana: It is a crime or public offense wherever fine or im-
prisonment is annexed. MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 94-112 (1947). See State ex rel.
Marquette v. Police Court of City of Deer Lodge, 86 Mont. 297, 283 Pac. 430 (1929),
where previous Montana decisions were rejected in holding that prosecutions for viola-
tions of ordinances are criminal and not civil actions. New Hampshire: Criminal prose-
cutions. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 47:17 (1955). See State v. Stearns, 31 N.H. 106
(1855). New Jersey: Criminal case. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:8-21 (1952). See City of
Absecon v. Vetesse, 13 N.J. 581, 100 A.2d 750 (1953), where the court pointed out that
since the adoption of the new court rules in 1948 it has become well established that for
procedural purposes the prosecution for a violation of a municipal ordinance is to be
treated as a criminal cause. New York: The violation brings a criminal action, al-
though not so strictly regulated as where "more important" issues are involved. City of
Buffalo v. Newbeck, 209 App. Div. 386, 204 N.Y.S. 851 (1924) ; City of Buffalo v.
Preston, 81 App. Div. 480, 80 N.Y.S. 851 (1903). North Carolina: Violation of ordinance
is made a misdemeanor. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-4 (1951). Violation of an ordinance is a
criminal offense punishable in criminal prosecutions, although before this statute the city
had to enforce through civil actions. Board of Education v. Henderson, 126 N.C. 689,
36 S.E. 158 (1900). See State v. Wilks, 233 N.C. 645, 65 S.E.2d 129 (1951). Ohio:
Violation of ordinance is a misdemeanor. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 715.67 (1953). Crim-
inal action is brought therefore. See City of Toledo v. Kohlhofer, 96 Ohio App. 355,
122 N.E.2d 20 (1954). Oklahoma: It is a criminal action whenever there may be initial
imprisonment or a fine of over $20. See Ex parte, Daugherty, 21 Okla. Crim. 78, 201
Pac. 537 (1921). Oregon: Criminal and not civil action. See City of Salem v. Read,
NOTES
have used perplexing terminology. Such terms as "quasi-criminal,"' 4
"quasi-civil,' "civil with certain criminal aspects,' 6 "not strictly crimi-
nal,"'" and "summary penal actions"' 8 have been used to describe the
prosecutions. In only nine states are the actions distinctly called "civil"
actions.'9 In but eleven states, however, may the infliction of initial im-
187 Ore. 437, 211 P.2d 481 (1949). Rhode Island: Criminal jurisdiction of district
courts includes offenses against town or city ordinances. R.I. GEN. LAws c.501, § 2
(1938). South Carolina: Criminal cases. S.C. CODE § 15-901 (1952). South Dakota:
Criminal cases. S.D. CODE § 34.3301 (Supp. 1952). Before the passage of this particular
statute in 1949, the Supreme Court of South Dakota was divided into their views on
whether the violation of a municipal ordinance was a criminal action. In City of Souix
Falls v. Famestad, 71 S.D. 98, 21 N.W.2d 693 (1946), the Supreme Court of South
Dakota held that violations resulted in civil and not criminal prosecutions. A year later
the court was split in holding that criminal procedure was applicable to violations of
municipal ordinances. City of Souix Falls v. Fanebust, 72 S.D. 54, 29 N.W.2d 472 (1947).
The revision of § 34.3301 in 1949 settled the question beyond reasonable doubt. Texas:
Criminal procedure applies. TEx. CODE CUMM. PRoc. ANN. arts. 867, 874, 876 (1950).
Utah: Prosecutions are criminal and not civil. See Town of Ophir v. Jorgensen, 63
Utah 288, 225 Pac. 342 (1924) ; Salina City v. Freece, 61 Utah 574, 216 Pac. 1078 (1923).
Virginia: Criminal action must be brought, even when recovering only fine. VA. CODE
§§ 19-298-342 (1950). See Washington & Old Dominion R.R. v. City of Alexandria,
191 Va. 184, 60 S.E.2d 40 (1950). Washington: Violation is misdemeanor or public
offense. WAsHr. REv. CODE § 35.23.440(31) (1951). See City of Seattle v. Bell, 199
Wash. 441, 92 P.2d 197 (1939). West Virginia: Criminal actions. See City of Charles-
ton v. Belier, 45 W.Va. 44, 30 S.E. 152 (1898), Town of Phillipi v. Kittle, 56 W.Va.
348, 49 S.E. 238 (1904). Wyoming: Criminal case. Wyo. ComP. STAT. ANN. § 29-1805
(1945). See State ex rel. Suchta v. District Court of Sheridan County, 283 P.2d 1023
(1955). Before this case the courts of Wyoming had considered the action civil, Jenkins
v. City of Cheyenne, 1 Wyo. 289 (1876), and then "quasi-criminal," City of Sheridan v.
Cadle, 24 Wyo. 293, 157 Pac. 892 (1916). Thus, the Wyoming courts haverun the gamut
in relation to this question and have finally arrived at a definitive answer.
14. Ex parte Hall, 255 Ala. 98, 50 So.2d 264 (1951) ; Noland v. People, 33 Colo.
322, 80 Pac. 887 (1905); Hawkinsville v. Etheridge, 96 Ga. 326, 22 S.E. 985 (1895);
State v. Brown, 50 Minn. 128, 52 N.W. 531 (1892); City of St. Louis v. Ameln, 235
Mo. 669, 139 S.W. 429 (1911).
15. Ex parte Corvey, 220 Mo. App. 602, 287 S.W. 879 (1926).
16. Vitelli v. Mayor and Council of Wilmington, 39 Del. 336, 199 A. 283 (1938).
17. Village of Litchville v. Hanson, 19 N.D. 672, 124 N.W. 1119 (1910).
18. See State ex rel. Sellars v. Parker, 87 Fla. 181, 100 So. 260 (1924) ; Ex parte
Sloan, 47 Nev. 109, 217 Pac. 233 (1923) ; Commonwealth v. Wesley, 171 Pa. Super. 566,
91 A.2d 298 (1952).
19. Arizona: See ARiz. CODE ANN. § 16-1105 (1939). Arkansas: Penalties recov-
ered as in civil action. ARK. STAT. § 19-2419 (1947). Illinois: See Village of Skokie v.
Schramm, 339 I1. App. 143, 89 N.E.2d 73 (1949) ; City of Chicago v. Moretti, 347 Ill.
App. 73, 105 N.E.2d 788 (1952). Indiana: When the action is to recover a fine. See
Smith v. City of New Albany, 175 Ind. 279, 93 N.E. 73 (1910) ; Miller v. O'Reilly, 84
Ind. 168 (1882). Nebraska: See Wells v. State, 152 Neb. 668, 42 N.V.2d 363 (1950).
In State v. Novak, 153 Neb. 596, 45 N.W.2d 625 (1951), the court hedged and admitted
the action was criminal in form, but was still civil for the collection of a penalty. New
Mexico: The New Mexico Supreme Court has held that when the municipal ordinance
penalizes only by fine, the action is civil. Tucumcari v. Belmore, 18 N.M. 331, 137 Pac.
585 (1913). However, where initial imprisonment may be imposed the action is criminal
and not civil, since it is form of the judgment which is crucial in the determination. See
City of Clovis v. Curry, 33 N.M. 222, 264 Pac. 956 (1928). Tennessee: See Guidi v.
City of Memphis, 196 Tenn. 13, 263 S.W.2d 532 (1953), Deitch v. City of Chattanooga,
195 Tenn. 245, 258 S.W.2d 776 (1953), O'Haver v. Montgomery, 120 Tenn. 448, 111 S.W.
449 (1908). However, in the latest Tennessee case the court has hedged in its termi-
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
prisonment for the violation of a municipal ordinance be secured through
actions which are not termed "criminal;" in five of these the action is
"civil" or summary,2" while in the others the action is termed "quasi-
criminal."'" Even in the thirteen states which authorize municipalities
to inflict only a pecuniary penalty for ordinance violations, the bare
majority designate the action to recover as "civil. 22
The Indiana rule is both complicated and interesting. The Indiana
courts have consistently held that the action to recover a penalty imposed
for the violation of a municipal ordinance is a civil action.23  Although
under Indiana statutes an ordinance may not prescribe punishment for
an act made penal by the state,24 and only statutes of the state may define
nology and has admitted that ordinances are "quasi-criminal" in nature, but that the
actions are governed by rules of pleading applicable to civil actions. Robinson v. City of
Memphis, 197 Tenn. 598, 277 S.W.2d 341 (1955). Vermont: By statute the fine must
be recovered by an action of contract. VT. REv. STAT. § 3738 (1947). Wisconsin: See
City of So. Milwaukee v. Schantzen, 258 Wis. 41, 44 N.W.2d 628 (1950).
20. Arizona, Florida, and Nevada, see notes 18 and 19 supra. Whether initial im-
prisonment may be imposed in a civil action is subject to question in Nebraska and
Tennessee, see note 19 supra. The cases which hold that the action is civil in these states
are phrased in the terms of recovery of a penalty and not in terms of imposing initial
imprisonment. In both of these states only certain classes of cities, composing only a
minority of the municipalities, may impose initial imprisonment, and the reported cases
are obviously determining the nature of actions under ordinances of these cities. See
note 1 supra. The rationale of these cases is certainly not adapted to apply to actions
where initial imprisonment may be imposed, so it is hoped that when ordinances of cities
which may impose initial imprisonment are the predicate of the action the courts will
follow the reasoning of the New Mexico courts and hold the action criminal and not
civil. See note 19 supra.
21. Alabama, Colorado, Georgia, Minnesota, Missouri, and North Dakota. See
notes 14 and 17 supra. The rule in Minnesota is subject to question. Although in City
of Mankato v. Arnold, 36 Minn. 62, 30 N.W. 305 (1886), the Minnesota Supreme Court
held that violations of ordinances did not result in criminal prosecutions, the holding was
expressly modified by the later case of State cx rel. Erickson v. West, 42 Minn. 147,
43 N.W. 845 (1889), where the court held that violations which involved a penalty of
fine or imprisonment were criminal offenses. However, this distinction made by the
court seems to have been lost, for the later cases have held the action civil and not crim-
inal. See State v. Jamieson, 211 Minn. 262, 300 N.W. 809 (1941). For an analysis of
the inconsistencies of the Minnesota courts on this matter, see Note, 36 MINN. L. Rxv.
143 (1952).
22. Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, Illinois, Pennsylvania, Vermont, and Wisconsin.
For limitations on the amount of fine in these states, see note 1 supra. See notes 16 and
19 supra, for the terminology of actions in these states.
The other six states require a criminal action: Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts,
New Hampshire, Texas, and Wyoming. See note 13 supra. There seem to be valid
sociological, if not legal, arguments for questioning the rule in these states. It does not
seem reasonable for a person prosecuted for the violation of an ordinance which may
result in only a pecuniary penalty to be subjected to the stigma of a criminal action.
See p. 500 infra.
23. Jerzakowski v. City of South Bend, 82 Ind. App. 132, 145 N.E. 520 (1924);
City of Indianapolis v. Woessner, 54 Ind. App. 552, 103 N.E. 368 (1913) ; Alles v. City
of New Albany, 175 Ind. 709, 93 N.E. 1080 (1911) ; Smith v. City of New Albany, 175
Ind. 279, 93 N.E. 73 (1910) ; Ridge v. City of Crawfordsville, 4 Ind. App. 513, 31 N.E.
207 (1892) ; Miller v. O'Reilly, 84 Ind. 168 (1882).
24. IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-2402 (Burns 1950).
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and fix punishment for crimes or misdemeanors,25 the Indiana legislature
has stipulated that actions to impose initial imprisonment shall be prose-
cuted in the same manner as minor state criminal proceedings, by the
municipal courts.2" When the action is to recover a pecuniary penalty
another statute provides for a civil action to be prosecuted in the name
of the city;27 it is this latter statute which has been the predicate of the
cases in which the Indiana courts have held prosecutions under municipal
ordinances to be civil actions.
The Constitution of the United States and the constitutions in the
various states guarantee the defendant in criminal cases the right to a
trial by jury."s When these provisions have been used as a defense in
cases involving the violation of municipal ordinances, some courts have
limited their applicability to actions where a jury trial was available be-
fore the adoption of the constitutions.29 Several other bases have been
used to determine whether an offense in violation of a municipal ordi-
nance must be categorized as a criminal offense or as a "petty offense"
which is not entitled to a trial by jury. Among these are the severity of
the punishment and the nature of the offense itself, whether malum pro-
hibitum or inalum in se."°
25. Id. at § 9-2401.
26. Id. at 4-203 (Burns 1946).
27. Id. at 4-2414. For the construction of these two separate statutory provisions,
see Indianapolis v. Woessner, 54 Ind. App. 552, 103 N.E. 368 (1913).
28. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; id. at art. IIn, § 2, ci. 3; ALA. CONST. § 6; AaIZ. CONST.
art. 2, § 23; ARK. CONST. art. 2, § 7; CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 7; COLO. CONST. art. II, § 16;
CONN. CoNsT. art. 1, § 9; DEL. CONST. art. 1; § 2; FLA. CONST. art 1, § 3; GA. CONST.
art. 1, § 2-105; IDAHO CONST. art. 1, § 7; ILL. CONST. art. II, § 5; IND. CONST. art. 1,§ 13; IOWA CONST. art. 1, § 9; KAN. CONST. Bill of Rights, § 5; Ky. CONST. § 7; LA.
CoNsT. art. 1, § 9; ME. CONST. art. 1, § 6; MD. CONST. Declaration of Rights, art. 21;
MASS. CONST. Part 1, art. XII; MICE CONST. art. II, § 12; MINN. CONST. art. 1, § 6;
Miss. CoNsT. art. 3, § 26; Mo. CONST. art. 1, §§ 18(a), 22(a); MONT. CoNsT. art. III,§ 16; NEB. CONST. art. 1, §§ 10, 11; NEv. CONST. art. 1, § 24; N. H. CONST. part 1,
art 15; N.J. CoNsT. art. 1, § 10; N.M. CONST. art. II, § 14; N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 2;
N.C. CoNsT. art. 1, §. 13; N.D. CoNsT. art. 1, § 13; OHIo CONST. art. 1, § 10; OKLA.
CONST. art. II, § 20, ORE. CONsT. art. I, § 11; PA. CoNsT. art. 1, § 9; R.I. CONST. art. 1,§ 10; S.C. CONsT. art. 1, § 18; S.D. CONsT. art. VI, § 7; TENN. CONST. art. 1, § 9; TEx.
CONST. art. 1, § 10; UTAH CONST. art. 1, § 12; VT. CONST. C.1, § 10; VA. CONST. art. I,§8; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 22; W. VA. CONST. art. III, § 14; WiSC. CONST. art. 1, § 7;
WYo. CONST. art. 1, § 10.
29. See Costello v. Feagin, 162 Ala. 191, 50 So. 134 (1909) ; McInerney v. City of
Denver, 17 Colo. 302, 29 Pac. 516 (1892) ; State ex reL Sellars v. Parker, 87 Fla. 181,
100 So. 260 (1924) ; Pearson v. Wimbish, 124 Ga. 701, 52 S.E. 751 (1906) ; City of Fort
Scott v. Arbuckle, 165 Kan. 374, 196 P.2d 217 (1948) ; State v. Fourcade, 45 La. Ann.
717, 13 So. 187 (1893) ; Delaney v. Police Court of Kansas City, 167 Mo. 667, 67 S.W.
589 (1902) ; McLaughlin v. State, 123 Neb. 861, 244 N.W. 799 (1932) ; Ex parte Sloan,
47 Nev. 109, 217 Pac. 233 (1923), Commonwealth v. Wesley, 171 Pa. Super. 566, 91 A.2d
298 (1952).
30. In this regard it is helpful to study a line of cases in the United States Supreme
Court which deal with the problem. In Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 340 (1888), where no
initial imprisonment was involved, the Court observed as settled that there are certain
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The latest Supreme Court pronouncement on the subject, District of
Columbia v. Clawans,3' involved a statute for the District of Columbia
which prescribed a penalty of not more than $300 fine or imprisonment
for not more than 90 days, or both, for dealing in second-hand personal
property without a license. 2 The majority of the Court held that no
constitutional right to a jury trial had been violated since before the
adoption of the Constitution a confinement for a period of ninety days
or more was occasionally imposed for petty offenses tried without a
jury.3 It is strange indeed that the Court, therefore, relied upon the
brittle reasoning which was directly refuted as erroneous two years be-
fore in the famous Blaisdell case. 4 The reasoning of Chief Justice
Hughes seems directly applicable to the clauses in the various constitu-
tions guaranteeing the right to trial by jury in criminal cases. In the
eighteenth century the right to trial by jury in England was not fixed,
but was evolving.3" The summary convictions allowed by the statutes
minor offenses that may be proceeded against summarily. In Natal v. Louisiana, 139
U.S. 621 (1891), which again did not involve initial imprisonment, Justic Gray pointed
out that trial by jury was unnecessary to punish for a petty violation against an ordi-
nance. In Schick v. United States, 195 U.S. 65 (1904), where again no initial imprison-
ment was involved, the Court indicated that there is no constitutional requirement of a
jury trial for petty offenses, and that the nature of the offense "and the amount of pun-
ishment prescribed" determine whether an offense is petty or serious. Id. at 68. In the
first case in which initial imprisonment was involved, District of Columbia v. Colts, 282
U.S. 63 (1930), the Court, through Mr. Justice Sutherland, held that the trial by jury
must be granted in this case, since the offense of reckless driving was nialuit in se,
and not merely nzalum prohibitum. It may be surmised that the severity of the punish-
ment criterion announced in the Schick case aided in determining whether the offense
was one in which trial by jury should be granted.
31. 300 U.S. 617 (1936). The minority, in a vigorous and stimulating dissent,
maintained that "constitutional guaranties ought not to be subordinated to convenience,
nor denied upon questionable precedents or uncertain reasoning." Id. at 634.
32. The majority of the Court conceded that the question of whether a jury trial
was guaranteed in such an action was "not free from doubt," and that the Court had
"refused to foreclose consideration of the severity of the penalty as an element to be con-
sidered. . . ." Id. at 625.
33. Id. at 625-26.
34. "It is no answer to . . . insist that what the provision of the Constitution
meant to the vision of that day it must mean to the vision of our time. If by the state-
ment that what the Constitution meant at the time of its adoption it means today,
it is intended to say that the great clauses of the Constitution must be confined to the
interpretation which the framers, with the conditions and outlook of their time, would
have placed upon them, the statement carries its own refutation. It was to guard against
such a narrow conception that Chief Justice Marshall uttered the memorable warning-
'We must never forget that it is a Constitution we are expounding.' . . Home Build-
ing & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 442-43 (1934).
35. See FORSYTH, HISTORY OF TRIAL BY JURY 165-72 (1875); JENIKS, SHORT His-
TORY OF ENGLISH LAW 52 (1938); KEETON AND LLOYD, THE UNITED KINGDOm, DEVEL-
OPMENT OF ITS LAWS AND CONSTITUTIONS 14 (1955). Indeed, the right to trial by jury
in England has seemed to decline in favor with certain English legal scholars. Ibid.
Keeton and Lloyd point out that in the present day "it is completely unknown in petty
sessions courts which try 90 per cent of criminal cases, virtually unknown in the county
courts and is becoming increasingly rare in the High Court." Ibid. Although the trend
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of Parliament were caused, in essence, by the limited nature of the judi-
cial system and the necessities of that time." History shows that at other
times in England the right to trial by jury was curtailed, even in relation
to serious offenses, and that Parliament reconsidered and repealed the
offensive statutes." The grant of power to justices of the peace to hear
and decide various actions for petty offenses was necessitated by the
strain on the judicial system in England, and was not the product of any
clearly defined formula for summary procedure." It is reasonable to
assume, that, had the widely diffused system of local courts, which this
country has today, existed in England prior to the formation of this
country, there would have been no necessity to devise a haphazard sys-
tem of summary convictions, which one famous justice of the peace
critically pointed out were in restraint of the common law. 9
The same reasoning is applicable to the argument that summary con-
victions were prevalent in the colonies and in the various states before
the adoption of the state constitutions; these summary convictions were
the spawn of a deficient judicial system, and not the product of intel-
ligent and logical jurisprudence. To suggest that today the courts are
bound by the practices and concepts, prevailing before the adoption of
the constitutions, which permitted summary convictions without trial by
jury when criminal sanctions could be applied, is clearly erroneous. 40
The clear majority of the states allow trial by jury for the violation
of municipal ordinances ;41 in only ten states may the penalty of initial
in England has been to diminish the role of the jury trial in criminal cases, this trend
does not answer the argument that under American constitutions courts should not be
bound by the practices and concepts which prevailed in England before the adoption of
these constitutions. The change in attitude and practices in England should, rather,
strengthen the proposition that when American constitutions were adopted the role of the
right to trial by jury was not settled in England, and, therefore, to be bound by practices
and concepts which were in flux almost two centuries ago is senseless.
36. Frankfurter and Corcoran, o. cit. supra note 9, at 923-24. Although the con-
clusion of this article seems erroneous, the historical documentation is excellent.
37. Id. at 924-25.
38. Id. at 927.
39. "The power of a justice of the peace is in restraint of the common law, and in
abundance of instances is a tacit repeal of that famous clause in the great charter, that
a man shall be tried by his equals." BURN, JUSTICE OF THE PEACE 159 (3d ed.).
40. It is submitted that the principle announced by Chief Justice Hughes in the
mortgage moratorium case, note 34 supra, and the caveat of the minority in the Clawans
case, note 31 supra, when combined, produce a forceful and irrefutable rebuttal to the
various state court opinions and the majority opinion in the Clawans case which hold
that there is no constitutional right to trial by jury even though initial imprisonment
may be imposed.
41. Taylor v. Reynolds, 92 Cal. 573, 28 Pac. 688 (1891) ; IDAHO CODE ANN. 50-340
(1949); ILL. ANN. STAT. § 71.045 (1942); IND. ANN. STAT. § 4-2607 (Burns 1946);
Ky. REv. STAT. § 26.400 (1955); Commonwealth v. Rawson, 183 Mass. 491, 67 N.E.
605 (1903); MD. ANN. CODE GEN. LAWS art. 23A, § 3 (1951); MICH. Comp. LAws
§ 90-11 (1948); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 74.615 (Vernon 1952); MONT. REv. CODES ANN.
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imprisonment be imposed without the right to trial by jury at some
stage of the proceedings.42 In several of these ten states, however, the
court opinions have construed statutes which authorize only pecuniary
penalties, and their attitude in cases which involve initial imprisonment,
therefore, may not be predicted with certainty. 3 In addition to adopting
the Clawans view to justify denial of a jury trial to violators of munici-
pal ordinances,4 state courts have reasoned that a jury trial should not
be granted because there are large numbers of violations, conduct in
cities is strictly regulated, and the penalties are usually small in compari-
§ 94-100-11 (1947); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:7-24 (1952) ; N.Y. CODE CI-M. PRoc. § 702;
in New Mexico, where initial imprisonment may be imposed the proceedings are criminal
and trial by jury may therefore be had. See City of Clovis v. Curry, 33 N.M. 222, 264
Pac. 956 (1928) ; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-156 (1951) ; N.D. REv. CODE § 40-1815 (1943) ;
OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2945.17 (1953) ; OKLA. STAT. tit. 39, § 57 (1951). See Ex parte
Daugherty, 21 Okla. Crim. 56, 204 Pac. 937 (1922) ; ORE. REv. STAT. § 221.918 (1955) ;
S.C. CODE § 15-901 (1952) ; S.D. CODE § 34.3304 (Supp. 1952). See Salt Lake City v.
Robinson, 39 Utah 260, 116 Pac. 442 (1911), where the court held that rules of criminal
procedure apply as in prosecutions for misdemeanors; TEX. CODE CiUm. PROC. art. 874
(1948) ; WASH. REV. CODE § 10.04.050 (1951).
Various other states grant the right to trial by jury in prosecutions for the viola-
tion of municipal ordinances on appeal. ALA. CODE tit. 37, § 464 (1940). See Ex parte
Hall, 255 Ala. 98, 50 So.2d 264 (1951) ; ARK. STAT. §§ 44-115-116 (1947) ; See Denver
v. Bredwell, 122 Colo. 520, 224 P.2d 217 (1950) ; IDAHO CODE ANN. § 50-121 (1949) ;
City of DeMoines v. Pugh, 231 Iowa 1283, 2 N.W.2d 754 (1942); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 367.8 (1949) ; Sprague v. Adroscoggin Co., 104 Me. 352, 71 A. 1090 (1908) ; City of
Clayton v. Nemours, 237 Mo. App. 167, 164 S.W.2d 935 (1942); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-
177.1 (1951); State ex rel. Suchta v. District Court of Sheridan County, 283 P.2d
1023 (1955).
42. ARiz. CODE ANN. § 16-1105 (1939); State ex rel. Sellars v. Parker, 87 Fla.
181, 100 So. 260 (1924) ; Pearson v. Wimbish, 124 Ga. 701, 52 S.E. 751 (1906) ; KAN.
GEN. STAT. § 13-616 (1949) ; State v. Fourcade, 45 La. Ann. 717, 13 So. 189 (1893) ;
State v. Collins, 107 Minn. 500, 120 N.W. 1081 (1909) ; MIss. CODE ANN. § 3374 (1942),
however, if the act is an offense against the penal law of the state, it becomes a criminal
offense against the city, and criminal procedure, etc., applies. See Sykes v. City of
Crystal Springs, 216 Miss. 18, 61 So.2d 387 (1952) ; NEB. REV. STAT. § 18-205 (1943);
NEV. COmP. LAWS § 1167 (1929); TENN. CODE ANN. § 6-217 (1955).
43. See State v. Novak, 153 Neb. 596, 45 N.W.2d 625 (1951) ; Wells v. State, 152
Neb. 668, 42 N.W.2d 363 (1950) ; State v. Hauser, 137 Neb. 138, 288 N.W. 518 (1939),
upheld the validity of the statute authorizing proceedings without trial by jury. See note
41 supra. Robinson v. City of Memphis, 197 Tenn. 598, 277 S.W.2d 341 (1955) ; Deitch
v. City of Chattanooga, 195 Tenn. 245, 258 S.W.2d 776 (1953).
44. In State ex rel. Sellars v. Parker, 87 Fla. 181, 100 So. 260 (1924), the Florida
Supreme Court utilized the reasoning of the majority of the United States Supreme
Court in the Clawans case. Note 31 supra and accompanying text. The Florida court
held that the argument concerning the impropriety of imposing initial imprisonment for
the violation of municipal ordinances without granting a trial by jury is met when it is
considered that this practice was prevalent in England and in this country before the
adoption of the Florida Constitution. The Georgia Supreme Court has held that to
require a trial by jury for offenses not triable by jury before the adoption of the Georgia
constitutional provision would attribute to the framers a purpose and intent never
entertained by them. Pearson v. Wimbish, 124 Ga. 701, 52 S.E. 751 (1906). These argu-
ments are amply refuted by the same reasoning which indicated that the holding of the
Clawans majority was untenable. See note 34 supra and accompanying text.
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son with the penalties under state law.45 These assertions have little
merit. If an offense is severe enough to enforce by a criminal sanction,
the community must be prepared to stand the inconvenience and in-
creased expense needed to grant the criminal procedural safeguards
which should be present when such a sanction may be imposed. More-
over, a penalty which may infringe the personal freedom of the accused
cannot be considered "small.""6
Reasoning' in other state courts declares that a jury trial is not neces-
sary in actions for the violation of municipal ordinances, because such
actions are civil, and not criminal, in nature. 7 These cases completely
ignore the fact that it is a criminal sanction which is being imposed and
that a loss of personal liberty results. Such actions either should not
result in the application of a criminal sanction, or if the sanction is ap-
plied the ordinary procedural safeguards which are present in criminal
actions should apply. This reasoning is followed in a number of
jurisdictions."
The right to trial by jury is not the only criminal procedural safe-
guard which, in certain states, is denied those accused of violations of
municipal ordinances. Courts have held that there is no double jeopardy
created when the city may appeal from a judgment of acquittal of the
45. See City of Fort Scott v. Arbuckle, 165 Kan. 374, 196 P.2d 217 (1948).
46. The history of this problem in the Supreme Court of Minnesota is unquestion-
ably mysterious. In 1886, the court held that summary convictions for the violation of
municipal ordinances, even though the penalty be a limited imprisonment were not only
constitutional, but necessary. City of Mankato v. Arnold, 36 Minn. 62, 30 N.W. 305
(1886). The reasons the court gave were that such convictions, because of their number
and nature, had to be summary to be effective and the prevalent practice before the
adoption of the constitution was to dispense with jury trials in municipal prosecutions
for ordinance violations. Three years later, these arguments were convincingly answered
in a direct modification of the previous holding. State ex rel. Erickson v. West, 42
Minn. 147, 43 N.W. 845 (1889). The court held that if the nature of the punishment
prescribed was imprisonment the offense was criminal within the meaning of the con-
stitution of the state, and, not only was trial by jury necessary, but the accused could
be held to answer only upon indictment or information of a grand jury. Nevertheless,
in the series of cases in Minnesota which follow this case the rule which seemed settled
has either been overlooked or abandoned. See State v. Siporen, 215 Minn. 438, 10
NAV.2d 353 (1943) ; State v. Jamieson, 211 Minn. 262, 300 N.W. 809 (1941) ; State v.
Collins, 107 Minn. 500, 120 N.W. 1081 (1909); State v. Brown, 50 Minn. 128, 52 N.W.
531 (1892). See Note, 36 Minn. L. Rev 143 (1952), for a convincing discussion show-
ing that the Minnesota courts are hopelessly lost in their attempts to treat this problem
logically and rationally. The conclusion of the note is itself a condemning indictment
of the Minnesota courts' reasoning: "Assuming that the right to trial by jury be pre-
served wherever possible, that right must nonetheless yield to practicalities." Id. at 154.
47. State v. Hauser, 137 Neb. 138, 288 N.W. 518 (1939); McLaughlin v. State,
123 Neb. 861, 244 N.W. 799 (1932).
48. See note 3 supra. New Mexico normally holds that the proceedings against
the defendant are civil, but when the form of judgment is imprisonment the proceedings
are then criminal. See City of Clovis v. Curry, 33 N.M. 222, 264 Pac. 956 (1928) ; Tu-
cumcari v. Belmore, 18 N.W. 331, 137 Pac. 585 (1913).
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defendant in prosecutions for the violation of municipal ordinances."9
This harsh and untenable judicial position has been reversed by at least
one legislature." In the majority of the states the city is not allowed to
appeal from an adverse judgment on the merits.5' Normally, where
appeals by the city are allowed, the sanction which may be applied is
pecuniary only;2 this is logically and historically sound, because the
action may properly be deemed civil when no initial imprisonment is
involved.
In some states the quantum of evidence required to convict an ac-
cused of a municipal ordinance violation is merely a preponderance,
rather than proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.5" This does not
seem improper when the proceeding is civil to recover a pecuniary pen-
alty for the violation of an ordinance, and the greater weight of the evi-
49. See Greeley v. Hamman, 12 Colo. 94, 20 Pac. 1 (1888) ; City of Ann Arbor v.
Riskin, 284 Mich. 284, 279 N.W. 513 (1938); Ex parte Sloan, 47 Nev. 109, 217 Pac.
233 (1923) ; City of Centerville v. Olson, 16 S.D. 526, 94 N.W. 414 (1903). An earleir
Michigan case had held that an appeal could not be taken by a village after a judgment
on the merits since initial imprisonment was authorized. Village of Northville v. West-
fall, 75 Mich. 603, 42 N.W. 1068 (1889). Both Nevada and South Dakota, since the
decisions in these cases have declared that the rule on appeals should conform to appeals
from criminal actions, and Michigan, by statute, has decreed that criminal procedure
shall apply. NEv. Comp. LAws § 1172 (1929) ; City of Wessington Springs v. Melbourn,
61 S.D. 452, 249 N.W. 747 (1933) ; MICH. ComP. LAws § 90.5 (1948).
50. The problems created by such rulings are well defined in an interesting Ala-
bama case, City of Birmingham v. Williams, 26 Ala. App. 200, 155 So. 878 (1934), in
which the Alabama Court of Appeals was forced to yield to the mandate of the Supreme
Court of Alabama which stipulated that the appeal of the city from the judgment of
acquittal would not put the defendant twice in jeopardy. It is interesting to note that
after this case the Alabama legislature enacted a statute which denied the city the right
to appeal from an adverse judgment unless the judgment was based on the invalidity of
the ordinance. ALA. CODE tit. 37, § 587 (1940). See Ex parte Hall, 255 Ala. 98, 50
So.2d 264 (1951).
51. See note 55 supra. Hawkinsville v. Etheridge, 96 Ga. 326, 22 S.E. 985 (1895);
City of Creston v. Ressler, 202 Iowa 372, 210 N.W. 464 (1926) ; City of Salina v. Wait,
56 Kan. 283, 43 Pac. 255 (1896) ; City of St. Paul v. Stamm, 106 Minn. 81, 118 N.W.
154 (1908) ; City of Water Valley v. Davis, 73 Miss. 521, 19 So. 235 (1896) ; City of
Miles City v. Drum, 60 Mont. 451, 199 Pac. 719 (1921) ; City of Newark v. Pulverman,
12 N.J. 105, 95 A.2d 889 (1953); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-179 (1951); Key v. City of
Ardmore, 36 Okla. Crim. 8, 234 Pac. 793 (1925) ; City of Salem v. Read, 187 Ore. 437,
211 P.2d 481 (1949) ; Salina City v. Freece, 61 Utah 574, 216 Pac. 1078 (1932) ; City of
Seattle v. Bell, 199 Wash. 441, 92 P.2d 197 (1939).
52. See Village of Skokie v. Schramm, 339 Ill. App. 143, 89 N.E.2d 73 (1949).
53. "Competent evidence" is needed before the jury on appeal to prove the de-
fendant's guilt. Snyder v. City of Denver, 123 Colo. 222, 227 P.2d 341 (1951) ; City of
Chicago v. Moretti, 347 Ill. App. 73, 105 N.E.2d 788 (1952); Smith v. City of New
Albany, 175 Ind. 279, 93 N.E. 73 (1910) ; State v. Siporen, 215 Minn. 438, 10 N.W.2d
353 (1943) ; "greater weight of the evidence" sufficient in Wells v. State, 152 Neb. 668,
42 N.W.2d 363 (1950) ; city needs only to make a "prima facie case," Deitch v. City of
Chattanooga, 195 Tenn. 245, 258 S.W.2d 776 (1953) ; City of So. Milwaukee v. Schant-
zen, 258 Wis. 41, 44 N.W.2d 628 (1950). It is important to note that in all of these
cases, except the Minnesota case, the' action was to recover a pecuniary penalty. Since
these cases do not involve initial imprisonment, they may be supported by logic and
history.
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dence is normally sufficient to sustain a decision in favor of the city."
However, in Minnesota, -where initial imprisonment may be imposed, the
conclusion that proof beyond a reasonable doubt is not necessary because
municipal ordinances are not criminal statutes and are not governed by
rules of criminal law, seems specious. "5 This position is contrary to the
holdings of the courts in most of the other states."
Another problem is presented by certain state court decisions that a
prosecution under a municipal ordinance does not bar an action by the
state under state penal statutes for the same act. It is axiomatic that
the authority for prosecuting the violation of a municipal ordinance must
be delegated to the municipality by the state; the municipality thereby
becomes an instrumentality of the state in the prevention of offenses
against health, safety, and welfare. Logically, if both the state and the
municipality may punish an offender for the commission of a single act,
the state, in effect, is punishing the offender twice. Most state courts
have completely rejected this "agency" argument, " stating that the act
is made penal by two separate units of government, and, therefore, action
by one is not a bar to prosecution by the other. A small minority of the
states hold that a bar is created."
Any attempt to resolve the problems resulting from denial of the
procedural safeguards to accused violators of municipal ordinances re-
quires consideration of several interests. The most important interest
54. See Wells v. State, 152 Neb. 668, 42 N.W.2d 363 (1950). Although a minority
of the cities in Nebraska are authorized to impose initial imprisonment this case involved
the recovery of a pecuniary penalty. The result in the Nebraska courts when the penalty
involves initial imprisonment is subject to question.
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involved is the right of a person accused of an act which may result up-
on conviction in the imposition of initial imprisonment and the loss of
personal freedom, to all the safeguards which apply in criminal prosecu-
tions. The community, on the other hand, has an interest in disposing
of prosecutions for minor infractions of municipal regulations with dis-
patch and without exorbitant expense. A third interest is the reputation
of the accused. A violator of a municipal ordinance directed against
improper parking, for example, should not be subjected to the notoriety
of a criminal action. It is clear that if all prosecutions for the viola-
tion of a municipal ordinance are considered criminal actions, the stigma
of criminality would improperly attach to the offender. There is also
a community interest in having ordinances with sanctions harsh enough
to dissaude the commission of serious offenses; certainly, in these cases,
the severity of the penalty should not depend upon the financial worth of
the offender.
Although these interests are divergent, they admit to a logical and
just resolution. If the community determines that an offense is so grave
that initial imprisonment should be set as the penalty, the community
must bear the inconvenience and expense involved in assuring the ac-
cused all the procedural safeguards of a criminal action. In the case
of less severe offenses, the community should prescribe only the imposi-
tion of pecuniary penalties, and these penalties should properly be re-
coverable in a summary or civil action.
The issues of the right to trial by jury, of not being put twice in
jeopardy for the same offense, and of having guilt proved beyond a rea-
sonable doubt are more serious than the mere sounding of academic and
abstract theories. A person accused of violating a municipal ordinance
which authorizes initial imprisonment as a sanction may lose his most
cherished civil liberty of personal freedom. In view of a judicial reluc-
tance to reject unsound precedent, it is incumbent upon the legislatures
in the various states to review carefully the statutes relating to the im-
position of fines and imprisonment and the procedures prescribed for
prosecutions under municipal ordinances in order to harmonize the statu-
tory provisions with the basic individual and community interests which
should be protected.
